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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
NEIL STEVEN PIXTON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20030146-CA 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: Did the trial court commit plain error in declining to reduce the charges 
against defendant from a third degree felony to a class B misdemeanor for a third DUI 
conviction in 10 years? 
Standard of Review: This issue involves interpretation of a version of Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-6-44 in effect when defendant committed his third offense ("the 2001 statute"). 
The trial court sentenced defendant under a newer, amended version of the statute with 
slightly different language ("the 2002 statute"). Because defendant did not ask the court 
to consider whether he should be sentenced under the 2001 statute—or whether it would 
make any difference— defendant proceeds under the "onerous plain error standard." 
State v. Labrum, 881 P.2d 9005 906 (Utah App. 1994), vacated on other grounds, 925 
P.2d 937 (1996). To establish plain error, an appellant must demonstrate: (i) an error 
occurred; (ii) the error was obvious; and (iii) the error was harmful. State v. Dunn, 850 
P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by Information with one count of driving under the 
influence, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44. R. 10. 
Defendant filed a motion to reduce the charge from a third degree felony to a class 
B misdemeanor. The trial court heard argument on that motion and later denied it. R. 89. 
On December 9, 2002, defendant entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the 
right to appeal the court's denial of the motion to reduce the charges. R. 78. 
On February 3, 2003, the court imposed a suspended prison term of zero-to-five 
years and placed defendant on probation for 36 months. R. 91. The court also imposed a 
$2,000 fine and ordered defendant to complete inpatient treatment for alcoholism. R. 93. 
Defendant timely appealed. R. 99. 
During oral argument before this court on February 25, 2004, both the State and 
defendant suggested that the Court allow supplemental briefing because the parties had 
briefed the case under the most recent 2002 version of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44, instead 
of the 2001 version, which was in effect at the time defendant committed his third DUI 
offense. The Court initially declined this request, but on March 1, 2004, issued an order 
requesting supplemental briefing. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For purposes of analyzing the issues raised in this appeal, the Court need only 
focus on the following chronology of events: 
A - * 998: First arrest (Sandy). Defendant was charged by citation with 
driving under the influence. R. 52. 
May 6,1998: First conviction. Defendant pleaded guilty to driving under the 
influence, a class B misdemeanor, and received a 30-day jail term and a $1,000 fine. R. 
51-53. The jail term was suspended, although defendant apparently did spend 30 days in 
jail in the summer of 1999 for unspecified probation violations. R. 56. 
January 11, 2001: Second arrest (South Jordan). Defendant was arrested for 
DUI in South Jordan and charged with a class B misdemeanor. R. 59. 
May 1S >001: Third Arrest (Murray). Defendant was arrested and charged by 
information with driving under the influence in Murray Justice Court. The case was 
initially charged as a class B misdemeanor. 
May J"4, .""Oil! Si UIIHI i niii'i irliou. Defendant pie, ui,.v: guilty to alcohol-related 
reckless driving in connection with the South Jordan charges. R. 5?. 
December 3, 2001: Murray charges dismissed. After learning of the May 24, 
2001, conviction on the South Jordan charges, the Murray City prosecutor concluded that 
the case must be charged as a third degree felony because it was defendant's third DUI-
3 
related conviction within a 10-year period. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(6)(A). The 
charges were dismissed without prejudice. R. 60. 
June 21, 2002: Murray charges refiled. The Salt Lake District Attorney's Office 
filed third degree felony charges in connection with the Murray DUI due to defendant's 
two prior convictions for alcohol-related driving offenses. R. 4-5. 
December 9, 2002: Third conviction. Defendant pleaded guilty to the Murray 
DUI charge. R. 73-80. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANT DID NOT PRESERVE HIS CLAIM BELOW. 
Defendant claims in his supplemental brief that his argument concerning the 
proper interpretation of the statute was preserved before the trial court because he filed a 
"motion to reduce charge" in which he argued that "the plain language of the statute 
requires that Mr. Pixton be charged with a class B misdemeanor because [he] did not have 
two prior convictions within ten years of the charge at issue . . . " Aplt. Supp. Br. at 11. 
However, the version of the statute cited to the trial court by the State and defendant was 
the 2002 version. Because the focus below was exclusively on the 2002 statute, the 
argument defendant now makes to this Court under the 2001 statute is unpreserved.1 
1
 Defendant claims in his supplemental brief that the ruling on the motion to reduce 
his charge shows that the trial court was relying on the 2001 version of the statute and 
that the issue was, thus, preserved. Aplt. Supp. Br. at 13. However, although the trial 
court appears to cite to the 2001 version of the statute, the quoted language shows that the 
court was actually referring to the 2002 version. In rejecting defendant's interpretation, 
4 
The current version of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 states: 
(2)(a) A person may not operate or be in actual 
physical control of a vehicle within this state if the person . . . 
has sufficient alcohol in his body that a subsequent chemical 
test shows that person has a blood or breath alcohol 
concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of operation 
or actual physical control. 
(6)(a) A conviction for a violation of Subsection (2) is 
a third degree felony if it is . . . a third or subsequent 
conviction under this section within ten years of two or more 
prior convictions;... 
(Emphasis added.) Under this version, the trial court properly rejected defendant's 
argument that his two prior convictions must be in place before the third offense may be 
charged as a third degree felony. The trial court was never asked to evaluate defendant's 
argument in light of the version of the statute in effect at the time, which stated: 
A conviction for a violation of Subsection (2) is a third 
degree felony if it is committed . . . . within ten years of two 
or more prior convictions under this section. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(6)(a) (2001). Because the trial court was never asked to 
interpret the language of the 2001 version, it committed no error in properly interpreting 
the statute before it. 
the court stated that "the enhancement applies upon a third 'conviction' within the 
prescribed time period; it does not address dates of arrest, nor dates when charged." See 
Findings, Conclusions & Order Denying Motion to Reduce Charge, dated February 12, 
2003, R. 96, Addendum A. 
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H. BECAUSE DEFENDANT'S CLAIM WAS NOT 
PRESERVED, IT MUST BE REVIEWED FOR PLAIN 
ERROR. 
Even assuming arguendo that the trial court erred, the error was not obvious. 
Indeed, the question of the applicability of the 2001 statute was not raised until the day 
before oral argument before this Court. Accordingly, defendant must proceed under the 
"onerous plain error standard." State v. Labrurn, 881 P.2d 900, 906 (Utah App. 1994). To 
establish plain error, an appellant must demonstrate: (I) an error occurred; (ii) the error 
was obvious; and (iii) the error was harmful. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 
1993). 
This Court has long recognized that "if the error was plain to the court, it should 
also have been plain to trial counsel, who should have raised an appropriate objection. 
For this reason, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel typically is raised in 
conjunction with alleging plain error." Labrum 881 P.2d at 906. Indeed, "in any case 
where appellate counsel finds himself or herself needing to use the plain error doctrine to 
get an issue before the appellate court, a red flag should go up warning of the likelihood 
of a concomitant ineffective assistance of counsel claim . . ." Id. at 907. 
Here, defendant's trial counsel participated in the case throughout and even filed 
and argued a motion to reduce charge based on the 2002 statute without raising this 
supposedly obvious error. Yet defendant asserts no claim of ineffective assistance. 
Because three or more defense attorneys, wrhom defendant tacitly concedes were 
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effective, as well as attorneys for the State and the trial judge participated in the case 
without noticing they were using the 2002 statute, it cannot have been obvious. 
III. DEFENDANT IS A THREE-TIME DUI OFFENDER 
AND SHOULD BE PUNISHED AS SUCH. 
In essence, defendant is asking this Court for a windfall. Even though Utah 
imposes enhanced penalties for a third DUI offense in 10 years, defendant believes that 
his three DUIs should be counted differently. Because the third DUI occurred 10 days 
before the guilty plea to his second DUI, defendant believes his third DUI conviction 
cannot be enhanced to a third-degree felony. Such an is offensive to public policy and 
should not be adopted by this Court. 
In State v. Hunt, 906 P.2d 311,312 (Utah 1995), the Utah Supreme Court rejected 
a similar argument advanced by a defendant in a drug case. Under Utah Code Ann. § 58-
37-8(l)(b), a defendant who is convicted of distributing a controlled substance "is guilty 
of a third-degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent conviction punishable under 
this subsection is guilty of a second degree felony." The defendant was charged with 
three counts of distributing marijuana with the second and third counts enhanced to 
second degree felonies as "subsequent" convictions, even though the charges were 
brought in a single information. Id. at 312. The defendant argued that the trial court 
misconstrued the statute because the intent of the Legislature was to allow the first 
offense to serve as a warning, thus allowing the defendant an opportunity to reform. Id. 
In rejecting this argument, the Supreme Court noted that the plain language of the statute 
7 
"does not address the timing of the offenses but only the number of convictions and when 
they are entered."/d. at 313. The court continued: 
According to [defendant's] first argument, the enhancement 
provision may not be invoked unless the second offense 
actually occurred after the entry of the first conviction. Under 
this reasoning, a defendant could commit an offense, be 
charged for that offense, and commit another while the 
charges were pending without being subject to the 
enhancement provisions. Even if the defendant sold narcotics 
outside the courthouse while awaiting the return of a verdict 
on the first charge, that crime would not qualify for 
enhancement under [defendant's] formulation of the statute. 
We decline to inject such an amendment into the otherwise 
plain language of the statute. 
Id. 
Like Hunt, defendant argues that before a "conviction" under Utah Code Ann. § 
41-6-44(6)(a) can act as an enhancement to a new offense, the second conviction must 
precede commission of the third offense. See, e.g., Supp. Aplt. Br. at 6. The Hunt court 
explicitly rejected this approach based on a reading of the plain language of the repeat 
drug offender statute, which imposes enhancements based on the number of convictions, 
regardless of the sequence of the offenses and convictions. Hunt, 906 P.2d at 313. 
Moreover, defendant is guilty of the precise evil the Hunt court warned against: 
That "a defendant could commit an offense, be charged for that offense, and commit 
another while the charges were pending without being subject to the enhancement 
provisions." Id. Indeed, under defendant's interpretation, the recalcitrant drunk driver 
could commit numerous additional offenses in the interval between his second arrest and 
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conviction, none of which would be chargeable as third degree felonies. Such an absurd 
result cannot have been the intent of the Legislature and must be avoided. 
IV. DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY CHARGED AND 
CONVICTED OF A THIRD DEGREE FELONY 
BECAUSE, AT THE TIME OF SENTENCING, HE HAD 
THREE DUI CONVICTIONS. 
Defendant claims the 2001 version of the statute supports his claim. He argues 
that in the portion of the statute stating "[a] conviction for a violation of Subsection (2) is 
a third degree felony if it is committed . . . within ten years of two or more prior 
convictions under this section," the indefinite pronoun "it" refers to "violation." Aplt. 
Supp. Br. at 7. Thus, according to defendant, the triggering event for the enhanced 
penalty is the commission of the third offense, not the conviction for the third offense. 
Defendant misreads the statute. Under defendant's interpretation, the term 
"conviction" at the beginning of the sentence becomes superfluous. If the Legislature had 
intended to base enhancements on a third violation, the statute would read: "A violation 
of subsection (2) is a third degree felony if it is committed... . within ten years of two or 
more prior convictions under this section . . ." Such an interpretation goes against rules of 
statutory construction requiring a reviewing court to construe a statute in a way that gives 
effect to all terms. See Beynon v. St George-Dixie Lodge #1743, B.P.O.E., 854 P.2d 
513, 518, n. 21 (Utah) ("Whenever possible, statutes should be construed so that no 
portion is superfluous."), cert denied, 510 U.S. 869 (1993). Thus, defendant's 
interpretation cannot be correct. 
9 
^^^mm^mmmmmmmmmmmmm 
Rather, this Court must assume that the Legislature used the term "conviction" 
advisedly. Where there is an ambiguity, this Court should attempt to interpret the statute 
in a way that implements legislative intent. "If there is doubt or uncertainty as to the 
meaning or application of the provisions of an act, it is appropriate to analyze the act in its 
entirety, in light of its objective, and to harmonize its provisions in accordance with its 
intent and purpose." Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1045 (Utah 1991); 
see also State v. Soma, 846 P.2d 1313,1317 (Utah App. 1993) ("Statutory terms should 
be interpreted and applied according to their commonly accepted meaning unless the 
ordinary meaning of the term results in an application that is either 'unreasonably 
confused, inoperable [] or in blatant contradiction of the express purpose of the statute.'") 
(quoting Morton Intel Inc. v. Auditing Div of the Utah State Tax Com Vz, 814 P.2d 581, 
190 (Utah 1991)). The intent and purpose of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(6)(a) is to 
enhance penalties for repeat DUI offenders and, in particular, to make a third DUI offense 
punishable as a third degree felony. As shown in section I above, this intent is effectuated 
only by reading the statute to provide to that the third conviction, not the third offense, is 
the triggering event. 
That this has always been the intent Legislature is demonstrated by passage of the 
clarifying amendment to the statute in the 2002 general session. In advocating passage of 
the amendment, Rep. A. Lamont Tyler, the bill's sponsor, noted the potential ambiguity in 
the statute and explicitly rejected defendant's proposed interpretation: "I think this is not 
10 
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the intent of the Legislature (inaudible) [and] it should be not the intent of our society." 
Floor Debate, statement of Rep. A. Lamont Tyler, Utah Leg., 2002 Gen. Sess., January 
25, 2002 (transcribed by Utah Attorney General's Office secretarial staff) (emphasis 
added) (Addendum B). 
Moreover, a review of the statute as a whole supports this interpretation because 
other sections imposing enhanced penalties focus a defendant's convictions, not the 
commission of the offenses. Even the section of the statute at issue used prior 
convictions, not prior offenses, as the events that allow imposition of enhanced penalties. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(6)(a) (2001) (enhancements imposed if third DUI is 
"within ten years of two or more prior convictions under this section") (emphasis added). 
Another example is section (3)(a) of the statute, which states that "[a] person convicted 
the first or second time of a violation of Subsection (2) is guilty of a" class A or B 
misdemeanor, depending on various factors (emphasis added). Subsection (b) states: 
A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) is guilty 
of a third degree felony if the person has also inflicted serious 
bodily injury upon another as a proximate result of having 
operated the vehicle in a negligent manner. 
(Emphasis added). Similarly, section (5)(a)(I) states: 
(5) (a) If a person is convicted under Subsection (2) within ten 
years of a prior conviction under this section, the court shall 
as part of any sentence impose a mandatory jail sentence of 
not less than 240 consecutive hours. 
11 
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(Emphasis added). Even section (6)(a) states that a DUI is a third degree felony if 
occurring "within ten years of two or more prior convictions under this section;. . ." The 
focus on the number of a defendant's DUI convictions as the measure for enhanced 
penalties throughout the statute strongly suggests that a parallel approach was intended 
for section (6)(a) and that the third conviction, not the commission of the offense, is the 
trigger. 
In short, a reading of section (6)(a) of the statue that makes a third DUI conviction 
punishable as a third degree felony is most in harmony with the remainder of the statute 
and most consistent with legislative intent. Thus, defendant's contrary reading should be 
rejected and his conviction of third degree felony DUI affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that defendant's 
conviction be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this j ^ 1 day of April, 2004. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
BRETT J. DELPORTO 
Assistant Attorney General 
12 
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Addendum A 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
J. KEVIN MURPHY (5768) 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)363-7900 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
NEIL STEVEN PIXTON, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW, & ORDER DENYING DEFENSE 
MOTION TO REDUCE CHARGE 
Case No. 021909726 
I 
Hon. Ann Boyden 
Through counsel, defendant Pixton filed a motion to reduce his "enhanced" driving under 
influence of alcohol (DUI) charge, a third degree felony based upon two prior convictions, to a 
class B misdemeanor. The issue was briefed, and on November 26, 2002, with defendant 
present, the parties' counsel orally argued the motion to this Court. The Court will now deny 
defendant's motion, based upon the following findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Based upon court documents and a letter from the Murray, Utah city prosecutor appended 
to the State's memorandum, the parties agree on these facts: 
1. In May, 1998, defendant Pixton pled guilty and was sentenced for DUI, a class B 
misdemeanor, in the Sandy, Utah justice of the peace court. 
mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm —"^—•— 
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DENYING MOT. TO REDUCE CHARGE 
State v. Pixton 
(pixton ffcl) PAGE 2 
2. In January 2001, defendant was arrested for DUI in South Jordan, Utah, and that case was 
filed as a class B misdemeanor in the South Jordan justice of the peace court. 
3. On or about May 15, 2001, defendant was arrested for DUI in Murray, in the case that 
eventually was filed in this Court. However, this DUI was initially filed, by citation, in 
the Murray justice of the peace court as a class B misdemeanor, for prosecution by 
Murray City. 
4. On May 24, 2001, defendant pled guilty to "alcohol-related reckless" driving (ARR) in 
his South Jordan case, and was sentenced for that class B misdemeanor. 
5. Some time after entry of defendant's South Jordan ARR conviction, the Murray City 
prosecutor learned of that conviction. Accordingly, on or about December 3, 2001, the 
Murray prosecutor dismissed the class B DUI citation in Murray JP Court, and referred 
this case back to the arresting police agency for felony prosecution due to the two prior 
convictions, in the Sandy and South Jordan JP courts. . 
6. On or about June 21, 2002, the Salt Lake District Attorney's Office, representing the 
State, filed the Murray DUI case as felony DUI, now pending in this Court, basing the 
felony enhancement upon the Sandy and South Jordan prior DUI/ARR convictions. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The defense argues that this case cannot be prosecuted as a third degree felony, 
enhanced DUI, because "[a]t the time of filing the enhanced third degree felony charge, 
Mr. Pixton had been convicted of only one prior DUI under Section 41-6-44(6)" (Def. 
Mem. at 2). He further complains that application of the enhancement to this case 
, i i in i i i w i — i i 1 1 ; 
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violates his constitutional due process right to notice (id. at 4).1 For the following 
reasons, this Court rejects the defense arguments: 
1. The defense does not dispute that defendant's 1998 Sandy DUI conviction may 
apply to enhance this case. 
2. The defense does not dispute that in general, a conviction for ARR, such as his 
May 24, 2001 South Jordan conviction, can apply to enhance a subsequent DUI 
conviction. See Utah Code § 41 -6-44(1 )(b)(ii) (2001). 
3. The DUI enhancement statute at issue in this case, section 41-6-44(6)(a)(i) (2001), 
states that the enhancement applies upon a third "conviction" within the prescribed 
time period; it does not address dates of arrest, nor dates when charges are filed. 
4. A "conviction" can mean either an adjudication of guilt awaiting sentencing, or an 
adjudication of guilt plus the sentence imposed on that adjudication. In this 
particular case, the latter definition can apply, because at the time this case was 
withdrawn from the Murray JP court and refiled by the State as an enhanced DUI, 
defendant had been twice previously adjudicated and sentenced for DUI and ARR, 
respectively. 
5. Because defendant had been twice previously convicted of DUI/ARR when this 
case was filed as an enhanced DUI, the State legitimately filed this case as an 
enhanced DUI. 
Defendant also argues that the State, at trial, must prove the prior convictions beyond reasonable doubt. The State 
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS & ORDER 
DENYING MOT. TO REDUCE CHARGE 
State v. Pixton 
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6. Because the enhancement statute plainly states that prior convictions trigger the 
enhancement, there is no constitutional "notice" violation in the application of the 
enhancement to this case. 
7. The State argues, in the alternative, that under State v. Hunt, 906 P.2d 311 (Utah 
1995), defendant would be subject to the enhancement even under the definition of 
"conviction" as a guilt adjudication without sentencing. Although this Court need 
not address this argument, this Court notes that appellate guidance on this issue 
would be helpful to the trial courts, in our efforts to fairly and consistently apply 
the DUI enhancement statute. 
ORDER 
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that defendant's motion to 
reduce this enhanced DUI charge to a misdemeanor is denied. 
DATED this /£& day of Fe& 200^-
/but*-* &&ZfrjZt>r^ 
ANNBOYDEN 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to Form: A 
y 
fZy^ /* y 
Attomeyibr Defendant 
does not dispute this proposition. 
FINDINGS;CONCLUSIONS & ORDER 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER was delivered to the following, this day of 
,200g" 
L. Monte Sleight 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Ass'n 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
J. Kevin Murphy 
Deputy Salt Lake District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Addendum B 
mmmmm 
HOUSE BILL 17 
2002 GENERAL LEGISLATIVE SESSION 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
DAY #5, JAN 25, 2002 
CLERK: House Bill 17: Multiple driving under the influence offences. L. Lamont Tyler. 
SPEAKER: Representative Tyler 
REP. TYLER: Thank you Mr. Speaker. I request that Mr. Paul Boyden of the State Board 
Association of Prosecutors of (inaudible) come to my desk to answer questions on this bill. 
SPEAKER: That would be fine Representative Tyler 
REP TYLER: Thank you. Representatives, House Bill 17 deals with a serious problem. The 
law requires that a person needs to be convicted of the first two DUPs before he committed the 
third one in order for that third one to count as a felony. I think this is not the intent of the 
Legislature (inaudible) it should be not the intent of our society. What this Bill does is correct 
that and provides a third conviction count as a felony without regard to when the offenses were 
committed. It also provides that, or clarifies rather, the fact that driving with a (inaudible) 
illegally controlled substance of the body (inaudible) count as a DUI and prior conviction which 
is reduced later by the court is also counted as a previous conviction. This bill is supported by 
the Prosecutors Association, The Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice, (inaudible) 
Commission, the Law Enforcement Legislative Committee, and the Utah Substance Abuse 
(inaudible). I'd be happy to answer your questions. 
SPEAKER: Further discussion to House Bill 17. No further (inaudible). Rep. Tyler, back to 
you for summation. 
REP. TYLER: We appreciate your support on this bill. Thank you. 
SPEAKER: The voting is open on House Bill 17. Seeing all present having voted, Rep. Divory. 
Voting will be closed. House Bill 17, having received 70 yes votes and zero no votes passes this 
body and will be referred to the Senate for further consideration, madam. 
